

A Weakly Supervised Deep Model for Cyberbullying Detection

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Cyberbullying

"willful and repeated harm inflicted through the use of computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices"
Patchin & Hinduja, 2006

- Forms of cyberbullying:
 - Offensive and negative comments
 - Name calling
 - Rumor spreading
 - Public shaming
 - Threads

Dangers of Cyberbullying

- Linked to mental health issues:
 - decreasing academic performance
 - depression
 - anxiety
 - suicide
- Cyberbullying
 - persistent
 - public
 - not bounded by location or time
 - can be anonymously

Younger adults especially likely to encounter severe forms of online harassment

% of U.S. adults who say they have experienced the following types of harassment online, by age

Less severe behaviors	Age 18-29	30+
Offensive name-calling	46	21
Purposeful embarrassment	37	18
Physical threats	25	5
Sustained harassment	18	5
Sexual harassment	15	4
Stalking	13	5

Any harassment: 67 vs 33
Only less severe behaviors: 20% vs 21%
Any of the more severe behaviors: 41 vs 12

Source: Survey conducted Jan. 9-23, 2017. "Online Harassment 2017". PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Machine Learning Challenges

- Cyberbullying involves rapidly evolving vocabulary and behavioral patterns
- Labeled examples of bullying require costly human expertise
- We must be able to learn with only weak supervision
- Need scalable algorithms for massive data
- Social structure is important

Co-Trained Ensemble Framework

- Two types of classifiers for harassment detection:
 - Message classifier ($f: M \rightarrow R$):
 - Input: message
 - Output: classification score for whether the message is an example of harassment
 - User-relationship classifiers ($g: U_2 \rightarrow R$):
 - Input: pair of users
 - Output: score indicating whether one user is harassing the other user

Training Objective

- Consistency loss: penalizes the disagreement between the message classifier and the user classifier
- Weak supervision loss: over message learner

$$\min_{\Theta} \frac{1}{2|M|} \sum_{m \in M} (f(m; \Theta) - g(s(m), r(m); \Theta))^2 + \frac{1}{|M|} \sum_{m \in M} \ell(f(m; \Theta)),$$

Labels: message learner score, user learner score, all parameters, consistency loss, sender, receiver, weak supervision loss.

- Weak supervision loss on message learner:
 - Lower bound: Harassment indicator e.g. curse words, slurs, etc.
 - Upper bound: Harassment counter-indicator e.g. 'thanks'

$$\frac{n^+(m)}{n(m)} < y_m < 1 - \frac{n^-(m)}{n(m)}$$

Labels: Lower Bound, Upper Bound

$$\ell(y_m) = -\log \left(\min \left\{ 1, 1 + \left(1 - \frac{n^-(m)}{n(m)} \right) - y_m \right\} \right) - \log \left(\min \left\{ 1, 1 + y_m - \frac{n^+(m)}{n(m)} \right\} \right).$$

Models

- Message learner:
 - BOW
 - Pre-trained doc2vec
 - Custom-trained embedding
 - Recurrent neural network (LSTM)
- User learner:
 - Pre-trained node2vec
 - Custom-trained embedding
 - None

Word2vec Embedding

- Shallow, two-layer neural networks are trained
- Semantically similar words having similar vectors
- Computationally-efficient model for learning word embeddings

Mikolov, et al. 2013

Node2vec Embedding

- Objective: maximizing the likelihood of preserving network neighborhoods of nodes
- Nodes neighborhood:
 - Communities the node belong to using BFS ($u \sim s_1$)
 - Structural equivalence using DFS ($u \sim s_6$)
- Interpolate between BFS and DFS using flexible biased random walk

Grover et al. 2016

Two Models

RNN Message Learner + Embedding User Learner

message learner: LSTM

user learner: embedding

Pre-trained Message Learner + Pre-train User Learner

message learner: doc2vec

user learner: node2vec

Experiments

Data summary

	# Users after preprocessing	# Messages after preprocessing
Twitter	180,355	296,308
noswearing.com	3,461 offensive unigrams and bigrams	
positive opinion words (Hu et al., 2004)	2,005 positive words	
BOW	1,000 hash functions	
RNN	2 hidden layer of 100 dimensionality	
Embedding	100 dimension	

Precision@k

- For each method: extract 100 highest bullying-score conversations
- Five annotators rate as "yes", "no", or "uncertain"
- Compare against Participant-Vocabulary Consistency (from our ASONAM 2017 paper)

Identity Statement

- Keyword score comparison:
 - 42 sensitive keywords:
 - Sexual orientation, race, gender, and religion
 - Create a corpus of sentences using the combination of sensitive keywords:
 - "I am a black woman."
 - Ideal, fair language-based detector should treat these keywords fairly
- Score-based Comparison:
 - Using different combination of message and user learners
 - Compute the average score of sentences containing each keyword

method	average score
rnn_emb	0.147
rnn_node2vec	0.257
emb_none	0.381
doc2vec_none	0.497
doc2vec_emb	0.504
rnn_none	0.506
doc2vec_node2vec	0.511
bow_emb	0.515
emb_emb	0.518
bow_node2vec	0.536
bow_none	0.543
emb_node2vec	0.588